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1. Overview 
 
Eric Silverman’s The Prudence of Love purports to offer a new philosophical account of 
love, one that supports the “simple claim [that] love contributes to the well-being of a 
loving person.” (1) In defending this “simple claim,” Silverman, an assistant professor of 
philosophy and religious studies at Christopher Newport University, places himself in the 
company of philosophers he refers to as eudaimonists about love: Aristotle and, still more 
importantly, Thomas Aquinas. He takes his primary philosophical opponent to be Kant, 
who “explicitly rejects any necessary connection between virtue and well-being.” (2) “In 
contrast,” Silverman writes, Aquinas 
 
construes love in terms of personal fulfillment and gives a clear reason for 
why love benefits the lover. He views love as part of humanity’s eternal 
destiny. The virtue of charity, which results in loving action, brings joy 
and peace to the charitable person. … For Aquinas, happiness requires the 
proper ordering of a person’s will toward her final end. (4) 
 
Silverman’s “neo-Thomistic” view is not straight Thomism: while it preserves Aquinas’s 
view that the lover benefits from being a loving person, and that love can bring “joy and 
peace to the charitable person,” it eschews the substantial religious and metaphysical 
commitments that Aquinas himself takes to support that position. What Silverman refers 
to as the “necessary” connection between loving and well-being is meant to be supported, 
instead, by philosophical and commonsense reflection, by the results of various empirical 
psychological studies, and by the definition of love that Silverman proposes and 
elaborates in the first half of the book. 
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Silverman argues that his account compares favorably to four competing contemporary 
accounts of love— those defended by Harry Frankfurt, Hugh LaFollette, Niko Kolodny, 
and David Velleman—in terms of the following criteria of adequacy: 
 
(1) An account of love must be flexible enough to apply to all types of love 
relationships, including those of impartial compassion or benevolence. As 
Silverman writes, it should identify “the essential features of love in a 
broad range of relationships and toward humanity in general.” (17) 
 
(2) An adequate account of love will “explain common psychological 
experiences associated with love,” including the unique nonreplaceability 
of the beloved, the tenacity of loving relationships, and the joy found in 
community with the beloved.” (17) 
 
(3) An account of love “should reconcile ethical concerns between partial 
love and impartial morality.” (18) 
 
(4) An account of love “must be compatible with construing love in terms 
of virtue” and should “distinguish between ideal love and inferior 
expressions of ‘love.’” (18) 
 
All four of these criteria, it is worth saying, embody substantive and to some degree 
controversial claims: can we assume that love must be capable of being reconciled with 
impartial morality, that it can be construed in terms of virtue, or even that there is a 
single, unified phenomenon that goes by the name ‘love’ and which appears in all of 
these contexts, including those involving no degree of special attention or partiality at all? 
Some of these doubts, particularly those having to do with impartiality, will be developed 
at slightly greater length in what follows, but there will not be space in this review to 
address all of them. 
 
 
2. Reasons and relationships 
 
Love, Silverman claims, can be defined as “a disposition towards relationally 
appropriate acts of the will consisting of disinterested desires for the good of the beloved 
and desires for unity with the beloved, held as final ends.” (19) This sounds at least 
somewhat plausible, but is also somewhat vague: in particular the bit about “relationally 
appropriate acts” is rather obscure. What makes certain acts “appropriate” relative to 
certain relationships, and why should this matter? Moreover, precisely what is the role 
that relationships play here? At least some of the time Silverman seems to go beyond the 
idea stated in the definition, that relationships somehow generate normative requirements 
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that distinguish between appropriate and inappropriate love-related behavior, to hold that 
our relationships are themselves reasons for loving the people we love. (The clearest 
statement of this is on page 33: “It is more appropriate to view the relationship itself as a 
central reason for love.”) 
 
Part of the reason for invoking relationships in this way seems to be to allow the theory to 
meet the second criterion identified above, which demands that our account of love 
recognize such phenomena as “the unique nonreplaceability of the beloved [and] the 
tenacity of loving relationships.” (In this, Silverman’s theory resembles that of Niko 
Kolodny, whom he acknowledges as an influence.) Theories that hold a loved person’s 
attractive or valuable qualities to be one’s reasons for loving, by contrast, are held to be 
unable to meet this criterion. If the attractive or valuable qualities of the people we love 
are our reasons for loving them, it is thought, then we are rationally required to stop 
loving them if they lose those properties, rationally required to transfer our love to any 
more attractive person who becomes available, and so forth.  
 
Let’s assume that we find such objections compelling. (As I have discussed elsewhere, I 
find some of them pretty unpersuasive on their face, and I believe the others can be 
defused as long as we think about practical reasoning in the right way, but I’ll leave that 
mostly to the side.) Making one’s relationship the reason for one’s love is meant to avoid 
these problems, since unlike valuable qualities, relationships are unique: you cannot have 
the same relationship with A as you have with B, though A and B might share many of 
the attractive qualities that draws you to them. 
 
There are many problems, though, with this move. Consider the following passage: 
 
While the beloved’s nonrelational attributes are not reasons for love, the 
beloved’s attributes are still important. First, the lover appreciates the 
nonrelational attributes. A father loves that his daughter s funny, playful, 
beautiful, and intelligent, but he does not love her because she is funny, 
playful, beautiful, and intelligent. If his daughter had other attributes, he 
would still love her and appreciate her other positive attributes. He loves 
her simply because she is she! If he met another child that was similarly 
funny, playful, beautiful, and intelligent, he would not love that child in 
the same way he loves his own. If he discovered another child who was 
funnier, more playful, more beautiful, and more intelligent, this new child 
would not replace the daughter in her father’s affections. (80)  
 
I am not sure quite how to understand this, and I certainly don’t find it convincing. Only 
on a simplistic view of what practical reasoning requires would we be tempted to think 
that a quality-based view would require the father to generalize or transfer his love in the 
ways suggested here. Moreover, I simply don’t know what it means to say that the father 
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“loves her simply because she is she.” (Is it meant to imply that he would have loved 
anyone who had been she? But metaphysically speaking, no one else could possibly have 
been she, so this is unhelpful.) Perhaps the claim is meant to be that the father would 
have loved his daughter, no matter who she turned out to be, i.e. no matter what she was 
like. But would anyone want to be loved that way, and would a love of that sort be worth 
anything? Suppose her father says to her, “I would have loved you even if you had had no 
redeeming qualities whatsoever. Indeed even if you had turned out to be deeply evil, a 
monstrous moral aberration, I still would have loved you just as much. Or if you had been 
so severely disabled that you never attained consciousness, and did not even physically 
resemble a human being, I still would have loved you just the same way as I do now.” It 
seems to me that a love of this sort would be lacking in something important. Indeed, not 
to put too fine a point on it, I think the daughter’s proper response, should her father 
voice such sentiments, would in fact be to feel somewhat insulted. 
 
Whether or not one’s relationships with those one loves count as reasons for loving them, 
it does seem to be true that the nature of a given relationship is relevant to determining 
what counts, and what does not, as appropriate behavior. Silverman’s appeal to this 
connection, though, raises some questions. Once again, the purpose of the appeal is clear: 
some such restriction is necessary if the proposed definition is not to give highly 
counterintuitive results. As David Velleman and others have pointed out, there are many 
ways of acting for the benefit of those whom one loves, or so as to bring about a union 
with those people, that would be inappropriate, awkward, and at times positively 
immoral. But if the appeal is only there to avoid generating counterintuitive results then it 
risks coming across as a bit of jerry-rigging: since our intuitions are heavily shaped by 
the same social and cultural upbringings that shape our understandings of what 
relationships require, it is only to be expected that the demands of particular 
relationships, as culturally understood, will line up with those intuitions. In this 
connection it is worth mentioning Silverman’s uncritical acceptance of norms against 
incest, which he mentions approvingly in passing but for which he provides no rationale 
other than an appeal to tradition:  
 
While there are disagreements concerning the proper relational context for 
passionate erotic love, virtually all thinkers and cultures agree that some 
relationships constitute a proper context for eros while others do not. For 
example, incestuous relationships are widely identified as vicious, 
improper, and destructive. (14) 
 
We might also note his complete avoidance of the topic of homosexuality—a surprising 
omission, given that the understanding of marriage that has dominated modern Western 
culture at least until recently would hold same-sex unions to be “vicious, improper and 
destructive” in much the way incestuous relationships are commonly seen as being. If this 
shared understanding does not, on Silverman’s account, give rise to prohibitions on such 
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relationships, it would be helpful to be told why not. More generally, rather than simply 
taking the validity of such shared social understandings for granted, an account of love 
should be prepared to investigate, and at times evaluate, cultural norms that determine 
what counts as appropriate and inappropriate love-related behavior. And it should make it 
clear which relationships, under what conditions, generate requirements by making 
various failures to love, or to express love, inappropriate. Are parents obligated to love 
their parents, and vice versa? Silverman seems to think so. Is a person forced into an 
arranged marriage obligated to love her spouse? This seems to me highly doubtful, but 
how, on Silverman’s view, are we to distinguish it from the previous case? 
 
 
3. Partiality, impartiality, and love for everyone 
 
The matter is complicated by the fact that, while we are supposed to love different people 
in different ways (depending on the nature of the relationship), on Silverman’s account 
we really ought to love everybody; this, at any rate, is what the virtue of love in its ideal 
form requires. “Love is not merely compatible with goodwill for all persons,” Silverman 
writes, “but requires goodwill toward all.” (86) And shortly thereafter: “Failure to desire 
union with another person is a failure to recognize that person’s humanity. Thus, it is a 
failure of love.” (88)  
 
This seems implausibly strong. Indeed, the idea that love involves a desire for union 
seems to me an argument against the view that one ought, or for that matter could, love 
everyone. In a world of several billion diverse individuals with discrete and frequently 
conflicting wants, goals, and conceptual frameworks, the idea that one might desire 
union, in any genuine and meaningful sense, with every one of these several billion 
seems hopelessly utopian. Nor is it clear why recognizing another person’s humanity 
requires the desire to achieve union with her: indeed, a crucial part of moral maturity 
seems to be developing the ability to tolerate and respect those whose goals and visions 
we don’t share, those whose lives we do not desire to mix and mingle with our own.  
 
It seems unrealistic and a bit naïve, then, to write that “Like Aquinas’s caritas, love is 
impartial in that it involves the same basic desires of the good for and unity with all 
persons.” (85) Again, since goods conflict, there doesn’t seem to be any such thing as 
“the good for … all persons”; and it seems doubtful that I ought to be required by love to 
desire the good for those people whose interests conflict with the interests of those whom 
I (especially) love. This would not be as troubling if we held a certain sort of objective 
theory of the good—one on which, for instance, the universe manifested a harmonious 
moral order, perhaps one overseen by a benevolent and omnipotent God, so that all 
apparent conflicts between distinct individuals’ interests were in fact only apparent. But 
Silverman’s neo-Thomistic view was supposed to eschew such metaphysical 
commitments; and on any subjectivist or even plausibly pluralistic objectivist view of the 
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good, there are enough conflicts between different individuals’ goods to make deep 
trouble for the claim that we could, let alone ought to, desire the good for everyone. 
 
Love and impartiality, then, cannot be reconciled as easily as Silverman seems to think. It 
is true that love can serve as a partial antidote to egoism by drawing an agent into a world 
larger than that of his own self-concern, and thus leading her, if not to put aside her own 
self-interest, at least to balance it against the needs of others. But love works in the other 
direction, too: a deep and pervasive element of love, and one that does not fit well with 
this part of Silverman’s account, is its tendency to pull us away from the broader social 
world and into smaller, somewhat insular communities from which others are excluded. 
Loving attachments to their families, particularly their children, motivates many well-to-
do citizens of Western countries to do far less than they otherwise might to help the 
distant but needy. Love can open one’s eyes to the reality of others, thus motivating the 
noblest of actions (Rick’s choice at the end of “Casablanca”). It is just as capable of 
blinding a person to the real needs of others, and thus of motivating indifferent, callous, 
and morally unjustifiable behavior (Almasy in “The English Patient”). 
 
Silverman emphasizes only the friendly face of love, and ignores its tragic and potentially 
destructive aspects; like the lover who is blind to the faults of his beloved, Silverman’s 
love of love seems to have blinded him to its darker dimensions.  As already mentioned, 
he writes near the beginning of his book that “an ideal account of love should reconcile 
ethical concerns between partial love and impartial morality,” and goes on to say that “a 
morally attractive account of love will show how partial love toward specific others and 
impartial concern for all are compatible.” (18) But it should now be clear that this begs an 
important and difficult issue. One might well hope that love and impartiality can be 
reconciled, but it is a mistake to assume that they can and to make this hope into a 
criterion of adequacy for theories of love.  
 
Moreover, Silverman neglects entirely to deal with the existence of the morally wicked. 
Must I desire to unite myself with people who are deeply and genuinely evil? Must I love 
such people? I doubt that either question should be answered affirmatively; at any rate, it 
is not obvious that either should be, and putting forward the view that we ought to love 
every human being obliges one to acknowledge the issue and to attempt to deal with it in 
a serious way. 
 
 
4.The eudaimonistic thesis 
 
According to Silverman, there are five main types of benefit that love confers onto the 
lover. Loving, by his definition (and, I would add, by any plausible definition) gives the 
lover final ends, which are necessary in order that we live purposeful lives. (Here 
Silverman draws on Harry Frankfurt’s excellent work regarding the usefulness and value 
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of final ends.) Loving also requires that the agent integrate her psyche, provides 
motivation for self-improvement, and improves the quality of the lover’s relationships. 
(Interestingly, Silverman claims that it is possible for unloving agents to have friends, 
while allowing that love “fundamentally changes the nature of” one’s friendships. (121) I 
would have thought that friendship impossible, and not merely less fulfilling, without 
love.) Finally, love provides access to certain epistemic goods including “self-knowledge, 
knowledge gained through empathy, and knowledge concerning what benefits humans.” 
(128) Silverman also considers Neera Badhwar’s  suggestion that love is inherently 
pleasurable, though in the end he takes a fairly skeptical stance toward it, largely on the 
basis that love can sometimes cause pain and thus is not “unqualified in its pleasantness.” 
(133) 
 
One might take issue with this particular list of benefits, arguing for the exclusion of 
some or the inclusion of neglected others. It is harder, perhaps, to imagine taking issue 
with the general claim that loving tends to lead to good things for the lover, at least in 
many cases. Silverman might say that he is insisting on something stronger: not just that 
love often leads to or even tends to lead to benefits for the lover, but rather, as he puts it, 
that there is a “necessary” connection between loving and well-being. But much depends 
on how we interpret this “necessary.” One might be tempted to read the eudaimonistic 
thesis as asserting that loving is guaranteed to make a person’s life better, or that the 
goods afforded to lovers in virtue of loving were of a higher order, in some deep sense, 
than those goods that are available to unloving agents. But neither of these seems to be 
Silverman’s view, and indeed he explicitly rejects the former: “Just as love in unusual 
circumstances can result in an overall loss to well-being,” he writes, “unloving 
dispositions can sometimes result in an overall increase in well-being.” (191)  
 
This is a sensible observation, but it leaves one wondering just what the “necessary” 
connection between love and well-being is supposed to be. In the final analysis it seems 
to amount to little more than the claim that there are certain good things that loving 
provides even when loving is, on the whole, bad. This is probably true, but the same 
could be said for eating chocolate or shooting heroin, neither of which are wholly 
negative (if they were, people would not seek them out and become addicted to them) 
even when they are on the whole negative. Given this, it is natural to wonder whether 
Silverman’s view really can be considered a version, or even a close relative, of Thomas 
Aquinas’s far more robust account, which really does assert a kind of necessary 
connection (but only at the cost of leaning fairly heavily on some deeply dubious 
metaphysics). At the same time it is somewhat hard to avoid feeling that the 
eudaimonistic thesis, as Silverman asserts it, is obviously true, which leads naturally to 
the question why it is necessary to devote an entire book to proving it true.  
 
Unfortunately, Silverman’s attempts to put an actual face on the anti-eudaimonistic 
position are not especially persuasive. His most frequently mentioned opponent is Kant, 
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but the passages he cites do not really establish that Kant would reject the kind of 
eudaimonistic thesis Silverman is putting forward. Rather, Kant (plausibly and sensibly) 
seems to deny the existence of a much stronger sort of alleged necessary connection 
between well-being and virtue, one that would guarantee that the world reliably and 
indeed unfailingly rewarded agents for their virtuous behavior. Silverman attributes to 
Kant the position that love “may cause the lover to risk his own happiness and well-being 
for the sake of the beloved,” (2) but any reasonable view of love ought to allow that such 
actions are at least possible. (It is an interesting and potentially significant question 
whether Silverman takes it that his own view would rule out such risk-takings. We saw 
above that he acknowledges that at least in “unusual situations” love can lead to 
diminished well-being; perhaps, though he would want to deny that love could lead an 
agent knowingly to take such a risk.) 
 
Other putative antagonists are brought in largely via association or speculation: 
 
David Velleman does not say whether love benefits the lover, but since his 
conception of love is modeled upon Kantian respect he likely shares 
Kant’s belief that virtue and love make no necessary contribution to the 
virtuous person’s well-being. Niko Kolodny also does not explore the role 
of love in the agent’s well-being. (93) 
 
This is hardly compelling evidence for counting Velleman and Kolodny among the anti-
eudaimonists. If they, and others, have neglected to mention the ways in which loving 
typically benefits the lover, it might well be because the claim that it does is sufficiently 
obvious and widely agreed upon to be taken for granted. It is just common sense, that is, 
that loving, even when it is not on the whole beneficial, does enrich and expand people’s 
lives, gives them a sense of meaning, teaches them things they would not otherwise learn, 
and provides various other benefits to those who engage in it. Love is desired, pursued, 
and obsessed over to a greater degree than nearly any other object one can think of 
(material wealth being the obvious exception in this society). The claim that “love is the 
only prudent way to live despite its risks” (135) might be a slightly odd way of putting 
the point—indeed, the language of prudence feels inappropriate here, and despite his 
having chosen to include it in the title of the book, nothing in Silverman’s argument 
makes it seem less so—but the idea it expresses is one that would find a good deal of 
acceptance among most audiences in our society, even if it were put forward unsupported 
by any argument at all. 
